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The Semantics of Adnominal Pronouns and Unagreement

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Abstract: This paper suggests that adnominal pronoun constructions (*we linguists* and its analogues in other languages) and unagreement share a common core meaning. Person features in the extended nominal projection introduce presuppositions about the membership of speech-act participants in the denotation of the DP. This is argued to be empirically more adequate than a suggestion in the literature that the meaning of unagreement would be fundamentally different from that of adnominal pronoun/pronominal determiner constructions. The claim that the nominal part of an adnominal pronoun construction establishes its basic denotation also distinguishes the present analysis from alternative views according to which adnominal pronoun constructions involve a relationship between one set denoted by the pronominal and the nominal part.

Keywords: semantics; person; unagreement; pronominal determiners; presupposition.

1. Introduction

Expressions like *we linguists*—I will refer to them as adnominal pronoun constructions (APCs) in what follows—have played a role in modern syntactic theory at least since Postal's (1969) influential proposal that the “so-called pronoun” in these constructions is actually an article. This idea was further developed by Abney (1987) into pronominal determiner analysis (as opposed to an analysis in terms of apposition), which has since been taken up by a series of authors (cf. among others Lawrenz 1993; Lyons 1999; Dechaine and Wiltschko 2002; Panagiotidis 2002, 2003; Rauh 2003, 2004; Elbourne 2005; Roehrs 2005).

The phenomenon of unagreement involves an unexpected first or second person plural marking on a verb, typically in correspondence with a definite plural subject (1)

and (2). Although I will leave those cases aside here, unagreement can also be observed with certain quantifiers as in (3).

- (1) Nai oi gynaikes eiste poly dynates.
 yes DET.NOM.PL women are.2PL very strong.PL
 “Yes, you women are very strong.” [Modern Greek]¹
- (2) En particular, los alemanes no deberíamos pensar
 in particular DET.PL Germans NEG must.COND.1PL think.INF
 que nosotros siempre sabemos más.
 that we always know.1PL more
 “We Germans in particular should not think that we always know better.”² [Spanish]
- (3) Poll-es gynaikes exoume perasei sta xronia
 many-NOM.PL women have.1PL passed in.DET.ACC.PL years
 tis efiveias asxim-es meres logo tis
 DET.GEN.SG youth bad-ACC.PL days because.of DET.GEN.SG
 akmis.
 acne
 “Many of us women have suffered bad days in the years of our youth because of acne.”³ [Modern Greek]

Unagreement is attested in several null subject languages, such as Modern Greek, Spanish, Catalan, Galician and Bulgarian. It is lacking in others, such as Standard Italian and European Portuguese. There is a variety of approaches to the syntactic analysis of the phenomenon (Bosque and Moreno 1984; Hurtado 1985; Taraldsen 1995; Torrego 1996; Ordóñez and Trevino 1999; Ordóñez 2000; Saab 2007; Rivero 2008; Rodrigues 2008; Villa-Garcia 2010; Ackema and Neeleman 2013; Choi 2013; Höhn forthcoming).

The present paper proposes a unified interpretation of person features in APCs and unagreeing nominal phrases, set within the general framework of Heim and Kratzer (1998). For reasons of space, I will restrict my attention to languages with unagreement here. Following Höhn (forthcoming), both APCs and unagreeing nominal phrases are

1 See <http://www.protothema.gr/life-style/Gossip/article/380049/> giorgos-liagas-ena-megalou-euharisto-se-oles-tis-gunaiques-gia-oti-mas-prosferete-s-auti-ti-zoi/, accessed 30 May 2014. In the interest of readability, I will gloss case and number only on their first exponent in the noun phrase, except where it is crucial for the point to be made. I will not gloss gender.

2 Europarl corpus via <http://en.bab.la/dictionary/spanish-english/nosotros-sabemos>, accessed 7 May 2014.

3 See <http://kerkyrain.gr/index.php/woman/omorfia-gunaka>, accessed 30 May 2014.

assumed to share the same basic structure. Building on a presuppositional analysis of person features (Heim 2008), I argue that the denotation of the nominal phrase in both constructions is determined by the nominal element (and potential adjectival modifiers). The person features simply introduce a presupposition as to the membership of a speech act participant in the denoted set, rather than being indicative of a set relation between a “we” or “you” group and a set introduced by the descriptive noun phrase (and possible adjectives). This holds independently of whether they are expressed overtly, as pronominals in APCs, or not, as in unagreement.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section will briefly summarize the morphosyntactic analysis of unagreement assumed here. The analysis of the semantics of person features suggested by Heim (2008) and its application to APCs will be presented in Section 3. The extension of this analysis to unagreement and a problem with a different analysis present in the literature will be discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Structure of Unagreement


This section provides a brief sketch of the structural analysis proposed for unagreeing DPs in languages such as Modern Greek and Spanish by Höhn (forthcoming). For details, the reader is referred there.

Höhn (forthcoming) suggests that the cross-linguistic variation in the availability of unagreement is due to structural variation in the location of person features in the extended nominal projection. Null subject languages such as Standard Italian allow no definite article in addition to the pronominal part of APCs, cf. (4), which is taken to indicate that they encode person features on D in accordance with pronominal determiner analyses of APCs (Postal 1969; Abney 1987, etc., see above), as illustrated in (5). This encoding of person and definiteness features on the same head is argued to be responsible for the absence of unagreement because person depends on the same head as the definiteness feature, which needs to be spelled out overtly in the presence of an overt nominal. Consequently, the head is necessarily spelled out by the pronominal determiner.⁴

4 A question raised by a reviewer about the lack of unagreement in Czech in spite of the availability of pro-drop extends to most other Slavic languages. As far as I am aware, the exceptions that show patterns analogous to (6) and seem to allow unagreement as expected either have definite articles (e.g., Bulgarian, Pomak) or are in the process of developing them (Slovenian). The simplest account for the lack of unagreement in the remainder of the Slavonic languages would tie it to their lack of definite articles, blocking them from acquiring a structure like (7). Note, however, that while it may be true for Indo-European languages that overt definite articles are a necessary condition for unagreement, this cannot be the whole story, considering that languages such as Georgian and Swahili seem to show unagreement in spite of a lack of definite articles.

- (4) noi (*i) linguist-i
 we DET.PL linguist-PL
 “we linguists” [Standard Italian]

(5)




In languages with unagreement, on the other hand, such as Modern Greek or Spanish, APCs require an overt definite article in addition to the pronominal, cf. (6). Höhn argues that in these languages person features are located on a higher functional head distinct from the one hosting definiteness, as illustrated in (7).

- (6) (a) nosotros *(los) lingüista-s
 we DET.PL linguist-PL
 “we linguists” [Spanish]

- (b) emeis *(oi) glossolog-oi
 we DET.NOM.PL linguist-NOM.PL
 “we linguists” [Modern Greek]

(7)



This structure makes the spell-out of the person features independent of that of the definiteness features; in particular, they can be silent, while definiteness is overtly realized as required. The person features of unagreeing subjects give rise to verbal agreement as expected, but they are able to refrain from spelling out the head hosting person features overtly, presumably as a result of the same process that is responsible for pro-drop in general.

3. The Semantics of Person and APCs

There is a tradition that suggests that ϕ -features on pronominals introduce a presupposition about the denotation of the element they are associated with (Cooper 1983; Schlenker 2003; Heim 2008). This can be formalized by means of partial functions as in (8), quoted from Heim (2008, 37). The symbol hc denotes the addressee in the discourse context c (the hearer in spoken language), sc the author (the speaker in spoken language).

- (8) (a) $[[\mathbf{1st}]]^c = \lambda x_c . x$ includes $s_c . x$
- (b) $[[\mathbf{2nd}]]^c = \lambda x_c . x$ includes h_c and excludes $s_c . x$
- (c) $[[\mathbf{3rd}]]^c = \lambda x_c . x$ excludes s_c and $h_c . x$

These functions are only defined under the condition that the entity x fulfills the condition imposed on it. Hence, functional application of a head containing a set of person features to a semantic object of the appropriate type $\langle e \rangle$, an entity, effectively imposes the accommodation of the respective conditions on the denotation of the entity. Otherwise, the function would be undefined and the utterance that contains it infelicitous.

For simplicity of exposition, I follow Heim in using atomic person features here. The relevant facts hold independently of the issue of the morphosyntactic nature of person features as either involving a set of binary features (Nevens 2007; 2011) or as unary features organized in a feature geometry (Harley and Ritter 2002). The discussion will be restricted to first and second person, ignoring the distinction between inclusive and exclusive first person plurals, which is irrelevant to the languages discussed.

For illustration, consider the simplified structure in (9) for the Greek phrase in (6b). The denotation assumed for the DP is given in (10). Following the proposal adopted in the previous section, functional application of the first person features to the DP is only defined if the speaker is included in the denotation of the DP, yielding a denotation like (11) for the complete PersP.

- (9) $[_{\text{PersP}} \text{emeis } [_{\text{DP}} \text{oi glossologoi }]]$

- (10) $[[[_{\text{DP}} \text{oi glossologoi }]]]^c =$ The unique set L of linguists salient in c .

- (11) $[[(9)]]^c = [\lambda x_c . x \text{ includes } s_c . x]$ (the unique set L of linguists salient in c)
 $=$ The unique set L of linguists salient in c iff $s_c \in L$, undefined otherwise.

In the remainder of this section I am going to present evidence in favor of the view that the person features do indeed introduce a presupposition. For ease of exposition, I will use the presuppositions typically assumed to be introduced by focus-sensitive particles for comparison

and focus on English pronominal determiner constructions in this section. The relevant data for an unagreement language such as Greek will be discussed in the next section.

Consider the sentence in (12) involving the focus-sensitive particle *also*. The meaning of the sentence can be split into an assertion (12a) and a presupposition (12b). The latter is a felicity condition that is met if and only if the sentence is uttered in a situation compatible with the proposition expressed in the presupposition. Simply put, uttering (12) is not felicitous if the addressee of the utterance did not meet anybody at the relevant party (for example because she did not attend it at all).

(12) You also met [_F John] at the party.

(a) Assertion: You met John at the party.

(b) Presupposition: You met somebody other than John at the party.

Importantly, sentential negation only affects the asserted proposition (13a), while the presupposition remains unchanged (13b). The sentence can still only be felicitously uttered if the addressee met somebody other than John at the relevant party.

(13) It is not the case that you also met [_F John] at party.

(a) Assertion: You didn't meet John at the party.

(b) Presupposition: You met somebody other than John at the party.

Assuming that APCs involve a presupposition as suggested above, the meaning of (14) can be split into an assertion and a presupposition as illustrated. As expected if (14b) is actually a presupposition, it remains constant under negation, as seen in (15b).

(14) We linguists are silly.

(a) Assertion: The linguists are silly. *or* Linguists are silly.⁵

(b) Presupposition: I am a linguist.

(15) It is not the case that we linguists are silly.

(a) Assertion: The linguists are not silly. *or* Linguists are not silly.

(b) Presupposition: I am a linguist.

⁵ The sentence seems to allow for an ordinary definite specific reading and a generic/kind reading. This is tangential to the issue of the presupposition, which is present in either case and could be characterized more precisely as “ s_c is a member of the set L of linguists,” where L could either be a specific, contextually specified set or the generic set of all linguists for the kind reading.

A further, related diagnostic for presuppositions is the wait-a-minute test (Shanon 1976; cf. also Matthewson 2004, 402 attributing it to Kai von Stechow p.c.). The presupposition of the sentence uttered by A in (16) cannot be rejected as readily as the assertion, a negative reply to the assertion cannot target the presupposition, cf. (16b), probably because the presupposition is constant under negation. In order to cancel the presupposition, some more elaborate device is necessary, for example, an expression such as *wait a minute* (16c).

(16) A: I also met [_F John] at the party.

B: No.

(a) *assertion denied*:

You didn't meet John.

(b) *presupposition not cancelable*:

% You didn't meet anyone at the party.

(c) *challenging the presupposition*:

Wait a minute, you didn't meet anyone at the party, you just sat in your corner!

The pattern for APCs is comparable, as shown in (17). Note that it does not matter for (17b) and (17c) whether *linguist* is singular or plural, i.e., whether the status of being a linguist is challenged for one or more people. The relevant issue is that it is challenged for the person uttering the initial sentence.

(17) We linguists have a lot to say.

(a) No, you don't. [assertion denied]

(b) # No, you are no linguist(s). [presupposition not cancelable]

(c) Wait a minute, I don't think you're a linguist/linguists!
[presupposition challenged]

Finally, the filter properties of certain constructions described by Karttunen (1973) provide a further useful tool to diagnose presuppositions. Conditionals, for example, generally project focus. A presupposition in the consequent of a conditional will remain intact (almost) independently of the value of its antecedent. However, if the proposition expressed by the presupposition is actually entailed by the antecedent, the presupposition does not project, i.e., it does not hold for the sentence. This is illustrated in example (18). The verb *stopped* in (18a) triggers the presupposition that Fred used to drink alcohol previously. This

presupposition remains intact even if the presupposition is embedded in the consequent of a conditional as in (18b). However, if the antecedent entails the presupposition of the consequent, namely that Fred used to drink alcohol, the presupposition does not project to the full sentence. Hence, (18c) does not presuppose that Fred used to drink alcohol.

- (18) (a) Fred has stopped drinking alcohol.
- (b) If he didn't come to the bar last night, Fred has stopped drinking alcohol.
- (c) If he used to drink alcohol, Fred has stopped drinking alcohol.

The same behavior can be observed for APCs. For simplicity, I am using second person APCs here. While the presupposition of (19a) that the addressee is an academic is retained for (19b), the (slightly insulting) sentence in (19c) does not presuppose this.

- (19) (a) You academics have a problem.
- (b) If the gossip is true, you academics have a problem.
- (c) If you are an academic, you academics have a problem.

This concludes my discussion of APCs. In the next section, I will argue that the semantics of unagreement structures can be dealt with in the same way.

4. The Semantics of Unagreement

In his discussion of unagreement in Bulgarian, Norman (2001, 83) provides the following characterization of its meaning:

Совокупный грамматический субъект – «мы» – формально здесь выражен флексией глагольного сказуемого, а его лексическая детализация (кто именно «мы»?) происходит при помощи существительного или целой именной группы, занимающей позицию подлежащего.

The joint subject—“we”—is formally expressed here by the inflection of the verbal predicate, while its lexical specification (who exactly are “we”?) is brought about through a noun or a whole nominal phrase which takes the place of the subject. (translation GFKH)

This implies that the overt DP in unagreement configurations delimits the otherwise only contextually defined “we” group. The discussion in this section aims to show

that while Norman’s quote is descriptively adequate, there is no need to postulate an independent “we” group referred to in the truth conditions of unagreement sentences. Instead, the DP itself will be argued to denote the plural subject of the predicate in parallel to the treatment suggested for APCs above. The impression of a “we” (or “you”) group is a side effect of the presuppositions discussed above. This analysis will be defended against an alternative that assumes two distinct plural entities to be complicit in determining the subject of an unagreement sentence: the “we” group and a proper subset of it, denoted by the overt DP.

As outlined in Section 2, I assume that unagreement has the same syntactic structure as regular APCs, so an unagreeing subject like the Greek *oi glossologoi* “the linguists” might have the structure in (20), identical to the APC structure in (9) above. Consequently, their meaning is also largely the same, as illustrated in (21).

(20) [_{Persp} [+auth,+pers] [_{DP} *oi glossologoi*]]

(21) [[(20)]]^c = [$\lambda x_c . x$ includes $s_c . x$] (the unique set L of linguists salient in c)
 = The unique set L of linguists salient in c iff $s_c \in L$, undefined otherwise.
 (= [[(9)]]^c)

Contrary to this analysis, Torrego (1996, n. 12) claims “that Spanish floating definite plurals do not have the appositive reading we linguists has in English.” She does not state explicitly what she means by “appositive reading,” but her discussion of the example in (22)—adopted from her (6a)—makes things somewhat clearer.

(22) Firmamos los lingüistas la carta.
 signed.1PL DET.PL linguists DET.SG letter
 “The linguists among us signed the letter.”⁶

Torrego (1996, 114f.) suggests the following characterization:

In [(22)] the *los*-NP is interpreted as a subgroup of individuals included in the reference of the first person plural pronoun “we”—something like “those of us who are linguists signed the letter.” In other words, [(22)] implies that at least one of the members of the first person plural pronoun “we” is not a linguist.

6 Notice that in her n. 7 the same sentence with the subject in preverbal position, *los lingüistas firmamos la carta*, receives the translation “we the linguists signed the letter.” She does not comment on the (in-)significance of this difference in translation. Her reason for providing the version in (22) is to show that the construction is not restricted to left-peripheral subjects. I will do likewise for the Greek example in (24), although it should be noted that to many speakers VSO orders are slightly odd without context.

Her characterization leaves open the question of the relation of the speaker to the two groups.⁷ According to the reading closest to the English translation as *the X among us*, it should be possible for the speaker to only be a member of the “we” group, but not of the X group. An alternative, more restricted reading of her analysis also requires the speaker to be a member of the X group. To illustrate the crucial difference between the two readings of Torrego’s *the X among us* and the *we X* analysis I am advocating here, consider the semi-formal truth conditions of (22) given in (23).

(23) $[[(22)]]^c = 1$ iff

- (a) the salient set of people P in c signed the salient letter in c and there is a salient set of linguists L in c, such that $L \subset P$, undefined if $s_c \notin P$.
[the X among us, v.1]
- (b) the salient set of people P in c signed the salient letter in c and there is a salient set of linguists L in c, such that $L \subset P$, undefined if $s_c \notin L$.
[the X among us, v.2]
- (c) the salient set of linguists L in c signed the salient letter in c, undefined if $s_c \notin L$.
[we X]

The analysis in (23a) can be rejected as empirically inadequate rather easily. Under this analysis the only restriction on s_c is that it be in P. But since according to this analysis there are non-linguists who have signed the letter (i.e., L is a proper subset of P), the proposition should be compatible with a situation where the speaker is not a linguist (i.e., $s_c \in P$ and $s_c \notin L$). According to my consultants, this is not the case, that is, the speaker needs to be a linguist for (22) to be uttered felicitously, and equivalently for its Greek counterpart in (24). Hence, (23a) can be ruled out on empirical grounds.

(24) Ypograpsame oi glossologoi to gramma.
signed.1PL DET.PL.NOM linguists DET.ACC.SG letter
“We linguists signed the letter.”

The analysis in (23b) requires the speaker to be a linguist, just like the *we X* analysis in (23c). They differ in the way the participants in the event are referred to. In the *we X* variant the subject is introduced as one entity, namely the set L of linguists, while in (23b) the set P denoted by “we” is the agent of the event and a second set L of linguists is introduced as a proper subset of the agent set. Consequently, (23b) is more restrictive than (23c): since $L \subset P$, (23b) asserts that there are members of the set of agents that are not linguists.

⁷ I assume here that her “implies” does not mean “implicates,” but that she is talking about an effect of assertion. In fact, the problems discussed below would not be resolved if this implication was supposed to result from a presupposition.

Notice that while such a situation is compatible with the *we X* approach as well, it is not part of the assertion there. This can be illustrated by reformulating the truth conditions in (23c) to the very similar (25). The weaker condition $L \subseteq P$ allows for the same situations as (23b) plus those where L and P are identical.

- (25) $[[(22)]]^c = 1$ iff the salient set of people P in c signed the salient letter in c and there is a salient set of linguists L in c, such that $L \subseteq P$,
undefined if $s_c \notin L$. [we X, v. 2]

The difference between (25) and the denotation proposed in (23c) is that using the latter to describe a situation which includes non-linguists as co-signers is pragmatically marked. The only group directly included in the proposition are the linguists; hence, if there are further relevant signers that are not mentioned, the conversational maxim of quantity is violated.

The difference between (23b) and (23c) is not trivial to diagnose empirically, since it hinges on the properties of individuals that are not explicitly mentioned (namely those in the complement set of L in P, $P \setminus L$). However, according to (23b) the speaker of (22) *asserts* that L is a proper subset of P. Therefore, it should be possible to test if the sentence is felicitous in a context where this relation does not hold because $P \setminus L = \{ \}$ and hence $P = L$.

To the extent that this is a legitimate diagnostic, the Spanish and Greek sentences in (26) and (27) contradict the predictions of the *the X among us* analysis. The first part of the Spanish sentence is identical to (22), while the continuation establishes that nobody else signed the letter. The Greek sentence in (27) makes the same point, with the second clause asserting directly that no non-linguist signed the letter.

- (26) Firmamos los lingüistas la carta pero nadie más
signed.1PL DET.PL.M linguists DET.SG.F letter but nobody else
la firmó.
CL.3SG signed.3SG
“We linguists signed the letter, but nobody else signed it.” [Spanish]

- (27) Ypograpsume oi glosslogogoi to gramma alla
signed.1PL DET.PL.NOM linguists DET.SG.ACC letter but
kanenas mi-glosslogos den to ypegrapse.
no non-linguist NEG CL.SG.ACC.N signed.3SG
“We linguists signed the letter, but no non-linguist signed it.” [Modern Greek]

Under the analysis in (23b), the sentences in (26) and (27) should be infelicitous because in both of them the second clause contradicts the assertion predicted for the first one.

Since the sentences are felicitous and interpretable for native speakers, the prediction seems to be wrong. I take this to be as an argument against the *the X among us* analysis in (23b). The *we X* analysis of (23c), on the other hand, makes no assertion about non-linguists and therefore correctly predicts no problems in these cases.

The examples in (28) and (29) reinforce this conclusion. The focus-sensitive particle *only*, as well as its Spanish and Greek counterparts, asserts that the proposition expressed by the sentence is false for all alternatives to the focused constituent, the linguists in this case. If the unagreement construction made the contrary assertion that someone who is not a linguist signed the letter, we would again wrongly predict a contradiction. Since both sentences are fine, they present another counterargument to (23b).

(28) Firmamos solamente los lingüistas la carta.
 signed.1PL only DET.PL linguists DET.SG letter
 “Only we linguists signed the letter.” [Spanish]

(29) Ypograpσαμε mono oi glossologoi to gramma.
 signed.1PL only DET.PL.NOM linguists DET.SG.ACC letter
 “Only we linguists signed the letter.” [Modern Greek]

To conclude, I want to show that the same indications of the presuppositional contribution of person features surveyed above for APCs hold for unagreement constructions as well. The examples are from Modern Greek, but the point made extends to Spanish (and in principle also to unagreement constructions in other languages).

The example in (30) shows that the presupposition introduced in unagreement is constant under negation, paralleling the APC example in (16) above. That is to say, (30) presupposes that the speaker is a student, irrespective of the fact that the clause containing the presupposition is negated.

(30) Den ischyei oti oi foitites eimaste epimeleis.
 NEG is.valid.3SG that DET.PL.NOM students are.1PL diligent
 “It is not the case that we students are diligent.”
presupposition: The speaker is a student.

Similarly, the presupposition of the unagreement construction cannot be denied the same way the assertion can, cf. (31b) vs. (31c). Instead, an analogue of the “wait-a-minute” construction is required to challenge the presupposition, as illustrated in (31d). This is also the effect observed with APCs in (17) above.⁸ Just like in that example, the

⁸ Notice that the same is true for the Greek APC counterpart of (31a) with a strong pronoun preceding the subject DP, i.e., *emeis oi foitites* “we (the) students.”

infelicity of (31c) does not depend on whether there is one addressee or multiple ones, and conversely (31d) would be equally acceptable with second person plural forms if the studenthood of a group of people is in doubt.

- (31) (a) Oi foitites eimaste poly epimeleis.
 DET.PL.NOM students are.1PL very diligent
 “We students are very diligent.”
- (b) Ochi, tempelint-es eiste.
 no lazybones-PL are.2PL
 “No, you are a lazy bunch.” [assertion negated]
- (c) #Ochi, den eisai/ eiste foitit-is/-es.
 no NEG are.2SG are.2PL student-SG/PL
 “No, you aren’t a student/students.” [presupposition uncancelable]
- (d) Katse, ma den eisai foitit-is!
 wait.imp but NEG are.2PL student-SG
 “Wait, but you aren’t a student.” [presupposition challenged]

Eventually, the presupposition induced by unagreement is subject to filtering by conditionals. The sentence in (32a) presupposes that the addressee is an academic. This remains intact in the consequent of the conditional in (32b), as expected for a presupposition. If the antecedent of the conditional entails that the addressee is an academic, however, the presupposition is filtered out. Hence, (32c) does not presuppose that the addressee actually is an academic. This closely resembles the behavior we have seen for APCs in (19) above.

- (32) (a) Oi akadimaikoi echete provlima.
 DET.PL.NOM academics have.2PL problem
 “You academics have a problem.”
- (b) An perasoun ta metra, oi akadimaikoi
 if pass.SUBJ.3PL DET.PL.NOM measures DET.PL.NOM academics
 echete provlima.
 have.2PL problem
 “If the measures pass, you academics have a problem.”

- (c) An (esy) eisai akadimaikos oi akadimaikoi
 if you.SG are.2SG academic DET.PL.NOM academics
 echete provlima.
 have.2PL problem
 “If you are an academic, you academics have a problem.”

These observations all point to the conclusion that with respect to the role of person features unagreement behaves like APCs after all, lending credence to an account of unagreement building on this parallel.

5. Quantified Phrases

While I cannot do justice to the rich topic of the interaction of quantifiers with the phenomena discussed here, I want to comment briefly on an issue raised by a reviewer. Consider the following (slightly modified) example provided by the reviewer.

- (33) Most of us Czechs are experts on beer, until we come to Bavaria.

The reviewer suggests that this sentence does not give rise to the inference that the speaker is one of the Czech beer experts, and that the present account wrongly predicts this inference. My intuition, supported by discussion with a native speaker of English, is that this does indeed not seem to be necessary. For example, the sentence could be uttered by a Czech person who has no particular interest in beer, but wants to comment on their (stereotyped) fellow-citizens. However, the reading of (33) on which the speaker is a beer expert is certainly possible, and may be the more salient one.

The inference that the speaker is Czech seems to be a proper presupposition, triggered by the first person features in the APC “us Czechs.” The controversial property is the speaker’s experthood. The presupposition trigger in “us Czechs” does not scope over the predicate *BEER EXPERT* and is therefore an unlikely source for the potential inference that the speaker is a beer expert. Instead, the person-related presupposition triggered by “we” in the second clause appears to be responsible.

Contrary to the reviewer’s worry, though, I do not see any particular problems arising for the approach advocated here. The use of “we” in the second clause may be construed as anaphoric in two ways, either picking out the set denoted by the whole quantified construction, i.e., the majority of Czechs, who are beer experts, or the restrictor of the quantifier, i.e., “us Czechs.” This vagueness seems to be what causes the ambiguity with respect to the speaker’s experthood. The first person presupposition of “we” requires that the speaker is a member of whatever set is construed as the antecedent. If it is “us Czechs,” nothing spectacular happens because this expression already contains a first person presupposition. Assuming that the initial presupposition is accommodated, we get the inference that the speaker is Czech, leaving open

the possibility that he or she is not a beer expert. On the other hand, if the whole set of people for which the quantified expression holds true is picked out, the effect of the presupposition is the requirement that the speaker be a member of that set. When this is accommodated, we get the stronger inference that the speaker is one of the Czech beer experts. Importantly, the presuppositions themselves are invariant in this view. What varies is what set they apply to.

6. Conclusion

In this article I have shown that both APCs and unagreement constructions give rise to presupposition effects associated with person features. On this basis, I have argued that the semantic analysis of unagreement should parallel that of APCs in that both contain presuppositions related to person features. Furthermore, I have shown that Torrego's (1996, 115) claim "that [the unagreement structure in (22); GFKH] implies that at least one of the members of the first person plural pronoun 'we' is not a linguist" is too strong if we assume this to be a claim about the assertions or presuppositions involved by unagreement. One way to interpret this is that unagreement does not need to make reference to two distinct sets, a "we" or "you" set and the set denoted by the subject. Instead, the data can be accounted for by assuming that the denotation of the subject is restricted by the presupposition induced by the person features involved in unagreement structures.

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